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The decision to request a preliminary injunction|a court order that bans a party from certain
actions until their lawfulness are ascertained in a nal court ruling at trial|is an important lit-
igation instrument in many areas of the law including antitrust, copyright, patents, trademarks,
employment and labor relations as well as contracts. The process of ling for a preliminary in-
junction and the court's ruling on such a request generates information that can aect possible
settlement decisions. We consider these implications when there is uncertainty about both the
plainti's damages as well as the merits of case in the eyes of the court. Both plainti and
defendant revise their beliefs about the case strength in dispute once they observe the court's
ruling on preliminary injunctive relief. We study how such learning aects the likelihood of set-
tlement. A precursor to this analysis is the study of the strategic role of preliminary injunctions
as a means to signal the plainti's willingness to settle.
Keywords: preliminary injunction, learning, signaling, screening, litigation, pre-trial motion,
settlement
JEL classications: D8 (Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty), K12 (Contract Law),
K21 (Antitrust Law), K41 (Litigation Process), J53 (Labor-Management Relations; Industrial
Jurisprudence), L4 (Antitrust Issues and Policies)1 Introduction
A preliminary injunction (PI) is a court order that can be requested in the course of litigation in
order to restrain a party from a disputed activity until the case is decided, either by a settlement
agreement or through an ultimate nding by the court. Preliminary injunctions are a common
tool used in litigation throughout many areas of the law. In addition to their importance for the
economics of litigation, an understanding of PIs is of particular interest to economists in the context
of patent-, copyright-, trademark- and anti-trust litigation, including anti-monopoly and merger
cases, as well as in labor, employment and contract law.
A few particularly prominent cases in which preliminary injunctions played a role include a 1997
trademark case brought against Microsoft (MS) by Sun Microsystems alleging that MS distributed
Internet Explorer 4.0 using the Java Compatible Logo without having passed all compatibility
tests|several PIs were granted and the litigants ultimately settled. The same rms were engaged in
civil anti-trust litigation in 2002 with Sun claiming that MS was maintaining an illegal monopoly in
Intel-compatible operating systems. After the granting of a PI (which was later diminished in scope)
the rms settled in 2004. In 2006 Bristol-Myers Squibb was granted a PI against Apotex in a patent-
infringement case concerning the blood-thinner Plavix|the case was also subsequently settled. In
a 1999 suit concerning software patents Amazon.com obtained a PI against barnesandnoble.com
concerning their `Express' checkout|the PI was subsequently revoked on appeal and the case
was settled in 2002. In 2001 a PI was issued against Napster in the copyright infringement case
involving le-sharing over the Internet|while a partial settlement was reached, Napster ultimately
declared bankruptcy in 2002. In 2009 EMC successfully obtained a PI in Massachusetts against a
former employee to bar him from starting employment at Hewlett Packard in California in alleged
violation of a `non-competition covenant.' Finally, in another current case, the American Trucking
Association was partly granted a PI against concession requirements of the ports of Los Angeles
and Long Beach; the case is still pending trial.
In this paper we study the role that preliminary injunctions play in the course of litigation by
disseminating information and resolving uncertainty. Following the seminal work by P'ng (1983),
Grossman and Katz (1983), Bebchuk (1984), Reinganum and Wilde (1986), Nalebu (1987) and
Spier (1992), there is now an extensive literature on how strategic information transmission aects
parties' optimal strategies leading up to and during the course of litigation.1 Here we consider
1Spier (2007) gives a general introduction to the economics of litigation, and Daughety and Reinganum (2008)
present an accessible introduction to pretrial settlement in particular.the strategic use of requesting and obtaining a ruling on preliminary injunctive relief. Our focus
is two-fold. First, in ling for a PI the plainti reveals information about his level of damages.
Second, the hearing on the motion and the court's subsequent determination on the request reveals
information about the merits of the case. Both of these considerations aect settlement negotiations
in the course of litigation.
When a plainti requests a PI the court weighs four factors in determining how to rule on the
motion: (1) the likelihood with which the plainti will prevail at trial, (2) whether the plainti
suers irreparable harm if the defendant is not enjoined, (3) the overall balance of harm between
the plainti and the defendant, and (4) the public interest.
Concerning the public interest (the fourth criterion) the most important consideration is up-
holding the law, which is actually addressed by the rst factor (see, e.g., Cunningham, 1995).2
Hence the fourth criterion is more narrowly construed and generally addresses how nonparties are
aected by the PI. Indeed, in the areas of most interest to us, the public interest rarely factors
into a ruling on the PI,3 and some argue that the third and fourth criteria be merged to assess the
overall eect of a ruling on potential harm (see, e.g., Lewis, 1993/94).
In determining the overall balance of harm the court assesses whether the expected damages
from an erroneous grant outweigh the expected damages from an erroneous denial.4 In so doing,
the court must explicitly assess the rst criterion, namely the likelihood that the plainti ultimately
prevails at trial. Moreover, as indicated by the second criterion, it is incumbent upon the plainti
to demonstrate that the harm suered is `irreparable.'
Irreparable harm is immediate if, for example, the plainti is at risk of going bankrupt or
the defendant may become judgment proof. However, the mere fact that damages could be hard
to assess (e.g., damages are not veriable) may result in subsequent remedies being \intolerably
random," (Lichtman, 2003, p. 198)|leading to a nding of irreparable harm. Indeed, especially
relevant for our settings, the following have been found to establish irreparable harm: potential
loss of market share, potential loss of market advantages, damage to reputation, loss of goodwill,
2For instance, in the case concerning Plavix mentioned at the outset Judge Stein wrote in his ruling that \Although
there are competing and substantial public interests at stake on both sides of this litigation, the balance of those
competing public interests slightly favors Sano. The public interest in lower-priced drugs is balanced by a signicant
public interest in encouraging the massive investment in research and development that is required before a new drug
can be developed and brought to market."
3Cases where the public interest has been cited in denying a PI generally involve severe disruptions of supply
chains or other strong adverse eects to non-litigants (see, e.g., Shapiro, 1993).
4This is known as the Leubsdorf-Posner balancing rule. Indeed Judge Posner's ruling in American Hospital Supply
Corp. v. Hospital Products Ltd., 780 F2d 589, 593 (7th Cir. 1986) goes so far as to state that: \This formula [...] is
not oered as a new legal standard [...]. It is actually just a distillation of the familiar four (sometimes ve) factor
test that courts use in deciding whether to grant a preliminary injunction." See also Leubsdorf (1978).
2confusion in the market place, or the encouragement of others to infringe.5 In fact, in many
instances, including patent, trademark and copyright cases, the plainti is \entitled to a legal
presumption of irreparable harm [upon a] `strong showing' of likelihood of success" (Shapiro, 1993,
p. 337).6 Thus, for most settings of concern to us, the critical factor for a successful motion is the
rst criterion|establishing the merits of the case. Indeed, Leubsdorf (2007, p. 35) states in regard
to preliminary relief in general (not just in corporate litigation) that \Under existing law as well
as under the Leubsdorf-Posner formulation, the strength of the plainti's case [...] is an important,
perhaps the most important, factor in determining whether the plainti can obtain preliminary
relief."
Traditionally the threshold for granting a PI was highest in patent-infringement cases com-
pared to other intellectual and industrial property disputes (Cunningham, 1995). However, since
its inception in 1982 the Federal Circuit Court of Appeals|which has jurisdiction over patent in-
fringement cases|has lowered the burden of proof for granting a PI from \beyond question" to a
standard of \reasonable likelihood."7
While corporate litigation is recognized as an important tool in strategic competition,8 despite
the importance and frequent use of preliminary injunctions in court proceedings, the analysis of
PIs as an integral part of a plainti's strategy at trial has by-and-large been eschewed in the
economics literature on litigation. A notable exception is Lanjouw and Lerner's (2001) study on
patent infringement litigation. While they acknowledge the important informational roles of PIs,9
they do not consider these implications on the process of litigation as their focus is dierent.
Recognizing the costs associated with PIs, including legal costs, they show that a patent holder
may be motivated to ask for a PI in order to impose nancial stress on the defendant. As a result,
nancially weak infringers who face the additional costs associated with the PI are more readily
willing to settle at terms favorable to the plainti. Their ndings are broadly supported by an
5See Shapiro (1993), p. 339 and the cases cited therein, but also Muze Inc. v. Digital On-Demand, Inc., 123
F.Supp. 2d 118, 131 (S.D.N.Y. 2000).
6See also Lichtman (2003) and especially Samuelson and Bebenek (2009) for a critique of this practice in the
context of copyright law.
7Cf. Atlas Power Co. v. Ireco Chemicals, 773 F.2d 1230, 227 U.S.P.Q. 289 (Fed. Cir. 1985). Consequently there
was an increase in the use of PIs (Shapiro, 1993, Shehadeh and Stewart, 2001) as well as an increase in the likelihood
of PIs being granted from roughly 40% to over 60% for the 10-year period after the establishment of the court
(Cunningham, 1995); similarly in the data from patent-infringement cases studied in Lanjouw and Lerner (2001)
roughly half of the PIs requested were granted.
8See, e.g., Bizjak and Coles (1995) or Briggs, et al. (1996) concerning civil anti-trust litigation, or Meurer (1989)
or Choi (1998) in regard to patent infringement.
9They remark that \in a world with uncertainty about case quality, a PI hearing may be a relatively cheap way
to obtain information about how a court would rule in an eventual trial" (p. 586).
3analysis of 252 patent infringement suits.10
In addition, there is a small recent legal literature on the role of PIs in the economics of litigation.
Brooks and Schwartz (2005) and Lichtman (2003) both allude to the important role that PIs can
play in generating and disseminating information in order to aect litigation and settlement. Brooks
and Schwartz observe that \[s]trategic use of preliminary injunctions by plaintis is not uncommon.
Parties often pursue preliminary actions, knowing that they are likely to get the same judge at the
nal stage [...] and that judge is unlikely to switch her views of the merits subsequently. This
may improve a party's bargaining power in settlement negotiations" (p. 386). Lichtman notes that
\[p]reliminary hearings|whether or not they lead to injunctions|surely do promote settlement by
increasing the information available to the parties" (p. 202). While these authors thus explicitly
recognize the importance of uncertainty and the dissemination of information in the course of
litigation, neither of the studies examine this role of PIs, as both move into other directions.11
We consider the strategic implications of PIs in mitigating two types of incomplete information
commonly encountered in litigation. First, a party often has private information about their payos,
leaving the opposing side uncertain about the motivations and incentives of their adversary. In our
setting the defendant is initially unsure about the degree of harm that the plainti is suering.
However, a plainti's request for a PI reveals bounds on the plainti's damage level, allowing the
defendant to structure settlement oers accordingly. Second, both parties have common, albeit
incomplete, information about the case strength. In this regard the hearing and subsequent ruling
on a request for preliminary relief reveal information about the merits of the case. As a result,
both the request itself and the subsequent hearing and ruling impact settlement decisions.
In Section 2 we present a stylized legal dispute in which a plainti suers damages due to the
purported oense of the defendant. The precise extent of the damages is the plainti's private
information. Upon ling a suit the plainti decides whether or not to move for a PI against the
defendant, given that pursuing such a request is costly.12 Upon observing both whether the plainti
10Another study is Boyce and Hollis (2007), who model how PIs in patent cases can be used to take advantage of
damage rules when there is no uncertainty about player's payos.
11Lichtman considers how a particular form of uncertainty about damage levels aects normative implications of
the Learned Hand rule and other cost-benet analyses used in courts; and Brooks and Schwartz focus on eciency
implications of liability vs. property rules in the application of injunctive relief.
12There are no court costs associated with the motion. However, the plainti must still overcome the burden of
proof and in doing so the plainti locks himself into specic legal strategies and arguments. As a consequence, the
costs of preparing the motion can be substantial as it is labor-intensive necessitating considerable attorney time at
an accelerated rate. Indeed, Lanjouw and Lerner's empirical ndings suggest that PIs \may be available only to
nancially stronger plaintis" (p. 575) as those who le for a PI tend to be twice as large as those who do not le in
terms of cash and equivalents and other measures. Consequently, some practitioners caution against the use of PIs
due to their costs (see, e.g., Johnson, 2002).
4moved for the PI and the court's subsequent ruling on it, the defendant makes a take-it-or-leave-it
oer for a settlement. If the plainti accepts the given settlement oer, the case ends; otherwise it
proceeds to trial.
The plainti's motion for a PI plays several informational roles. First, in Section 3, it is demon-
strated that the ling for a PI reveals information about the damages suered by the plainti.
Hence, in light of the ling decision, the defendant is able to update her beliefs about the unob-
servable damage level and account for this in making an out-of-court settlement oer. We nd that
the plainti is more inclined to move for a PI with this informational aspect in mind compared to
the case without such consideration. Indeed, there always exist plainti types who only choose to
le for a PI because by doing so they are oered better settlement terms from the defendant. This
reveals a signaling eect of a PI in that some plainti types le for a PI just to send the signal that
they are not suering low damages.13 Interestingly, we show that due to this strategic use of PIs
the number of cases that are settled out of court increases, which may result in substantial savings
of litigation and court costs.
Second, in Section 4, we consider how the hearing on the PI and the court's ruling reveal
information about the case, which allows litigants to update their beliefs about the case strength.
Specically, we assume that the plainti and the defendant hold common beliefs about the case
strength that reect some (legal) uncertainty regarding the issue at hand. In making a ruling
on the request for preliminary injunctive relief the court reduces this uncertainty as both parties
glean the court's initial assessment of the merits of the case.14 We show that a granting of a
PI generally leads to less settlement as plaintis are more willing to proceed to trial, despite an
increased settlement oer from the defendant. Conversely, a denial of a PI increases the chances of
out-of-court settlement, despite a reduced settlement oer|providing a possible rationale as to why
the granting of a PI should be considered an extreme measure. Finally, while the initial incentive
to le for a PI may be unaected by the anticipation of subsequent learning about the merits of
the case, the probability of an out-of-court settlement nonetheless unambiguously increases when
accounting for learning due to the hearing and ruling on the PI request.
13This is similar to Spier (1992) and Daughety and Reinganum (2002) where by virtue of accepting or rejecting
settlement oers defendants reveal information about their types; and it is similar to Posey (1998), who studies the
signaling value of hiring an attorney in insurance claims cases and Chon e and Linnemer (2010), who consider signaling
through pretrial investment in case preparation, which in their model results in augmented expected damage awards
by a xed factor.
14In particular, e.g., the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure state that \In granting or refusing an interlocutory
injunction, the court must [...] state the ndings and conclusions that support its action" Fed. R. Civ. P. 52(a)(2).
Similar rules apply in States' courts.
52 The Basic Model
The legal conict under consideration involves a plainti rm (of male gender) and a defendant rm
(of female gender), both of whom are risk neutral. Absent the legal dispute rms earn a constant
discounted prot stream of i, where i 2 fp;dg, with p and d being mnemonics for the plainti and
defendant. The implication of the constant discounted prot stream is that litigants have a base
payo of i at any point in time, independent of which stage of the litigation process is reached.
The conict begins when in order to secure a benet b the defendant embarks on allegedly
unlawful actions that adversely aect the plainti rm, e.g., a purported patent, copyright, or
trademark infringement, or actions in violation of civil anti-trust, employment or labor laws, or a
breach of contract. Due to the actions of the defendant, the plainti suers overall damages of x.
The damages may be correlated with b, but they are unveriable in that they reect the plainti's
subjective assessment of counterfactuals concerning his future payos. Moreover, the precise extent
of these damages are private information of the plainti; the defendant knows only the distribution
of possible damages, denoted by F(x) with dierentiable density f(x) on [x;x]; where F(x) satises
the reverse monotone hazard rate condition (MHRC), i.e., f=F is non-increasing. F() may either
reect a priori beliefs about damages, or is the result of remaining uncertainty after some prior
unsuccessful settlement negotiations, which are not formally modeled as they do not aect the use
of the preliminary injunction. In contrast, the defendant's benet b is assumed to be common
knowledge.15
The interaction between the parties goes through three phases, depicted in Figure 1. For
simplicity, we assume that in the rst phase (i.e., the pre-trial motion phase) no damages occur,
as these would be sunk in any event and therefore not aect the litigants' strategies. In this phase,
upon incurring a cost of cPI, the plainti can request preliminary injunctive relief to enjoin the
defendant so as to stave o the damages that accrue in the course of further litigation in the second
phase, x.16 That is,  2 (0;1) denotes the portion of the total damages from the disputed action
that accrue during the second phase and are thus subject to the PI, whereas the remainder (1  )
15In many settings b is private information. However, since the size of b has no direct bearing on the strategic
use of the PI for informational purposes, common knowledge about b does not aect our analysis, provided that b
and F() are uncorrelated. A correlation between b and F() is to be expected especially in civil antitrust cases, and
possibly also in IP cases (in which case the degree of harm inicted might also be subject to strategic considerations
by the defendant); but less so in contract disputes, where the party being accused of breach generally takes actions
in light of outside opportunities. In any event, assuming a correlation between b and F(), while maintaining that b
is also private information, requires that the model account for higher-order beliefs (i.e., the beliefs that the plainti
has about the defendant's beliefs about x), making the model cumbersome.
16These damages may be quite substantial as subsequent litigation may last very long (e.g., the patent infringement
case of Polaroid v. Kodak lasted well over a decade).
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Figure 1: Structure of the Game
proportion of damages accrue in the nal phase (the post-trial phase) and are thus subject to nal
adjudication by the court.
In order to focus on the informational implications tied to the use of PIs, we consider their
basic `defensive' role designed to prevent current damages; and abstract from their `oensive' use,
in which the request is designed to harm the defendant. Therefore we assume that no costs are
incurred by the defendant rm in the course of a PI hearing and no benets accrue to the defendant
in the second phase, since otherwise the plainti's ling decision is confounded by how legal costs
and a possible grant of the PI aect the defendant's bargaining position in settlement negotiations.17
There are two sources of uncertainty in the model. The rst is the uncertainty that comes about
because the damages suered by the plainti are private information. Specically, the defendant
does not know what type of plainti she is facing. The second source of uncertainty is unrelated
to this and is given by both parties' common uncertainty about the legal merits of the case. In
characterizing the three phases of the model, we now describe how the two sources of uncertainty
are aected by and aect the parties actions.
At the outset of the rst phase the plainti decides whether or not to seek a preliminary
17In Subsection 5.2 where we briey address legal remedies in addition to equitable relief, we also discuss benets
that accrue concurrent to the legal proceedings.
7injunction against the defendant. In equilibrium, this decision depends on the damage level x, with
only plainti types who have suciently high damages seeking preliminary injunctive relief. Thus,
the decision to le allows some inferences about the plainti's type. If a PI is sought, a hearing
on the motion ensues, upon which the court either dismisses the motion or enjoins the defendant.
To keep the model tractable, we assume that evidence submitted during the hearing contains no
(further) information about the plainti's damages. This assumption is warranted to the degree
that the plainti's main objective at the PI hearing is to establish a strong showing on the merits
of his case, which frequently then establishes a presumption of harm. Moreover, to the extent
that the plainti does present evidence of damages, the focus is primarily on showing that harm is
irreparable. Nevertheless, our assumption should be viewed as limiting since the plainti always has
an incentive to substantiate before the court and the defendant a high level of damages. Because
we abstract from this possibility, the court's ruling on the motion is necessarily independent of
x and we thus let  denote the belief that each party commonly holds that a request for a PI is
granted.18
As for the second source of uncertainty, we initially also suppose that the hearing and court's
ruling on a PI are uninformative about the merits of the underlying case, which allows us to isolate
the signaling aspects of a PI request that alleviate asymmetric information between the parties.
However, in Section 4, we extend the analysis by considering how the hearing and the court's
ruling on the PI allow both parties to learn about the case strength|information that is used
to draw inferences about the court's possible ultimate ruling should the case go through to nal
adjudication.
There are two stages in the second phase, beginning with settlement negotiations and culminat-
ing in the trial and nal adjudication should an out-of-court settlement agreement not be reached.
Specically, upon observing both whether the plainti moved for the PI and the court's subsequent
ruling on it, the defendant makes a take-it-or-leave-it oer for a settlement, denoted by SO, that
allows the disputed behavior to continue in the nal phase. That is, the defendant oers to buy the
right that the plainti claims to be entitled to. If the plainti accepts the given settlement oer,
the game ends with an out-of-court settlement.19 Otherwise the trial stage is entered during which
18It is possible to include an updating of beliefs on damages that is specically conditioned on the hearing or the
ruling, but this signicantly complicates the model and does not overturn the ndings of the simpler structure.
19Indeed, it is not unusual for a trial to be agreed to be stayed after a PI ruling specically so that the litigants
have a chance to come to a settlement agreement, see, e.g., Grundfos Pumps v. Laing Thermotech, No. C-07-4033
JSW, Stipulation and Order (1) Entering Preliminary Injunction and (2) Ninety Day Stay (N. Cal. Oct. 26, 2008)|a
case that was indeed then settled.
8litigation costs of ci;i 2 fp;dg associated with the actual trial are incurred. Each party bears its
own costs regardless of the outcome at trial, that is, the American fee rule is assumed.
For purposes of greater clarity, we assume that the court only considers equitable relief, that
is, the court determines the legality of the disputed activity and then issues or denies a permanent
injunction.20 In particular, there are two possible underlying states concerning the case. In the
`valid' state the plainti wins if it comes to a nal ruling at trial. That is, the court rules in favor
of the plainti by permanently enjoining the defendant rm, resulting in continuation payos equal
to the base prots i for both rms. Alternatively, in the `invalid' state the court|when called
upon|nds in favor of the defendant, ruling the disputed behavior to be permissible, in which case
base payos are modied by  (1 )x and b, respectively. The prior probability that both parties
commonly hold that the case is valid is given by .
We conclude by assuring that litigation is a credible option for both parties. For the defendant
this is the case whenever the cost of litigation is smaller than the potential gain from her actions
weighted by the probability that she prevails in court (i.e., whenever cd < (1   )b). Similarly,
pursuing litigation is credible for all plainti types whenever the cost of litigation is less than
the smallest level of post-trial damages weighted by the probability of winning the case (i.e.,
cp < (1   )x).
Before presenting informational concerns that arise in ling for a PI, we briey consider the
plainti's basic motivation for ling for a PI. That is, we derive the benchmark threshold for
ling for a PI when the sole objective is to avert the damages that accrue during the trial phase.
Specically, a plainti who refrains from seeking a PI suers damages of x during the trial phase.
These damages can be averted by ling for a PI at the cost of cPI, provided that the court issues a
favorable ruling on the PI and (tentatively) enjoins the defendant, which occurs with probability
. Thus, a plainti les for a PI whenever
p   cPI   (1   )x > p   x (1)
() cPI < x:
Abstracting from trivial cases in which the ling for a PI is so cheap that the plainti chooses to le
regardless of the level of damages, or so costly that none is ever sought, the benchmark motivation
20Depending on the type of the case, litigants may also consider other pre-trial motions and the court may also
consider other remedies. For instance, in the data considered in Bizjak and Coles (1995), while over two thirds of
cases are led seeking (only) equitable relief, the remainder expressly (also) seek monetary damages (i.e., legal relief).
We briey address this in Subsection 5.2.
9for ling for a PI is given by




PI for x  ^ xB := cPI

N for x < ^ xB := cPI
 ;
(2)
where PI designates that a request is led, whereas N identies the case in which no PI is sought,
and ^ xB 2 (x;x) denotes the threshold (benchmark) level of damages above which a PI is sought.
As noted above, the benchmark use of ling for a PI is purely defensive. We now consider how
informational considerations aect the plainti's ling decision and, thus, alter the threshold type.
3 Signaling and Screening Prior to Trial
The analysis of the benchmark demonstrates that plainti types suering relatively low damages
(below ^ xB = cPI=) refrain from incurring the cost of requesting a PI, whereas those with high
damages incur the cost by ling for a PI. Thus, the defendant recognizes that ling for a PI
reveals information about the damages suered by the plainti. This, of course, aects the possible
settlement oers that the defendant is willing to entertain. Because ling for a PI aects the
possible terms of a settlement, the plainti, in turn, takes this into consideration when formulating
the decision on whether to request a PI|i.e., the plainti may use the PI to signal bounds on his
damage levels.
With these informational dynamics in mind, we analyze the litigants' optimal strategies while
hypothesizing that in equilibrium it is known that plainti types below a certain threshold level of
damages do not le for a PI, whereas those above do. That is, we make use of the following initial
conjecture, which is veried in equilibrium.
Conjecture 1 (Monotonicity in Filing for PI) There exists a damage level ^ x such that any
plainti with damages below ^ x does not le for a PI, whereas all others do.
3.1 Screening: The Defendant's Optimal Settlement Oer
Using backward induction, we begin our analysis at the outset of the second phase of litigation.
At this stage the court has already issued its ruling on any PI request if a PI was sought. The
proportion  of damages are sunk so that proposed settlement oers concern the remaining (1 )
proportion of damages that are yet to accrue.
10To determine the defendant's optimal settlement oer it must rst be established when a plainti
is willing to accept a proposed settlement. To this end, let V denote the plainti's expected payo.
When accepting an arbitrary settlement oer of SO, his payo is given by the (time-invariant)
constant base payo p, augmented by the amount of the settlement oer SO, and diminished by
future losses due to the continued actions of the defendant rm (1 )x, i.e., V S = p+SO (1 )x,
where the superscript S denotes the out-of-court settlement.21
In contrast, if the plainti proceeds to trial his payo consists of the base payo p, diminished
by the costs of litigation cp and the costs associated with a possible ruling against him at court
(1   )(1   )x. That is, V T = p   cp   (1   )(1   )x, where the superscript T denotes the
decision to go to trial.
Dene xS as the damage level suered by the plainti rm that is just willing to accept a given
settlement oer SO. The plainti accepts the settlement oer whenever V S  V T, so the marginal





with all plainti types with x  xS settling out-of-court.
In light of the defendant's uncertainty about the plainti's damages, in order to determine
the optimal oer, she must estimate the likelihood that a settlement oer is accepted, given the
history of the game. In light of Conjecture 1, the defendant updates her beliefs about the damage
level suered by the plainti upon observing the plainti's decision on whether or not to le for
a PI. Letting H 2 fPI;Ng denote the history of a PI having been requested (PI) or not (N),
and letting ^ xc denote the defendant's conjecture about the plainti's cut-o for ling a PI, the






1 F(^ xc) x 2 [^ xc;x] and H = PI
F(x)
F(^ xc) x 2 [x; ^ xc] and H = N:
(4)
Given these beliefs, the (subjective) probability that a plainti accepts a given settlement oer SO
is thus given by FH  
xS
.
Consider now the defendant's optimal settlement oer. If the litigants settle out-of-court, the
defendant pays out SO, the case is dropped and the defendant receives her benet of b, yielding a
21In equilibrium, settlement oers are history-dependent and are denoted by SO
H with H indexing the history of
the game. In analyzing the plainti's actions, we consider arbitrary oers SO.
11payo of d   SO + b. If settlement is not reached, the defendant incurs litigation costs cd, but
stands a chance to prevail at trial so that the defendant's payo is d   cd + (1   )b. Hence, the
defendant's (history dependent) expected payo from making a settlement oer SO is
d + FH  
xS
( SO + b) +
 
1   FH  
xS
( cd + (1   )b): (5)
It is worth noting that if the defendant's benets are very large, her strategy is to simply buy o
the plainti. Also, if her benets are very low, she will not make any settlement oer to a plainti
who has revealed relatively high damages by ling for a PI. In either of these extreme cases the
plainti makes a ling decision independent of the defendant's strategy and we therefore abstract
from these cases.
Having determined the defendant's subjective expected payo, we can derive the settlement
oer she proposes. Making use of the relationship between SO and xS given in (3) the rst order





b + cd + cp
(1   )
: (6)
From this the defendant's optimal settlement oers follow.
Lemma 1 (Screening) Given beliefs ^ xc, the defendant's unique optimal terms of settlement as a
function of the plainti's ling decision, denoted by SOH, with H 2 fPI;Ng are





(1   )^ xc   cp if
F(^ xc)
f(^ xc) + ^ xc <
b+cd+cp
(1 ) ;
(1   )xN   cp else.
(7)
with the amounts xN and xPI being implied by (6) in conjunction with (4).
If the condition on the top branch of SON is met, then no interior solution to the defendant's
problem exists when no PI is sought, given the defendant's beliefs about the threshold for ling.
In this case she simply oers to buy the plainti o, in light of the perceived level of damages.
Otherwise the interior solution is implied by the bottom branch of SON.
Lemma 1 shows how a defendant's optimal settlement oer is aected by her beliefs about the
damage level caused by the action. As a result, the defendant makes distinct settlement oers,
12depending on whether a PI is requested or not.
3.2 Signaling: The Plainti's Decision to File
Given the defendant's possible settlement oers as a function of her beliefs about the threshold
plainti type ^ xc and the history of whether a PI is requested or not, we derive the plainti's choice
whether or not to le for a PI. Once the plainti les a suit against the defendant without the motion
for a PI, he cannot avoid the trial phase damages (the right-hand-side of (1)). Subsequently, the
plainti can either accept the proposed settlement terms SON, or proceed to trial. In the latter
case the payo is equal to p   x   cp   (1   )(1   )x.
Alternatively, by Lemma 1, the plainti can agree to the out-of-court settlement and drop the
case, suering damages of (1   )x. In this case, the payo is p   x + SON   (1   )x =
p  x cp  (1 )(x  minfxN; ^ xcg). By construction of the settlement oer, a plainti with
damages below minfxN; ^ xcg prefers to settle, whereas one with greater damages proceeds to trial.





V N;T(x) := p   x   cp   (1   )(1   )x; x > minfxN; ^ xcg;
V N;S(xj^ xc) := p   x   cp   (1   )(x    minfxN; ^ xcg); x  minfxN; ^ xcg;
(8)
where, as before, the superscript S designates an out-of-court settlement, whereas T denotes a
continuation to trial.
If the plainti seeks a PI, then the defendant draws the inference that the plainti's damage
levels are high and therefore oers SOPI. Filing for a PI entails the immediate cost of cPI, whereas
with probability  a favorable ruling will stave o the trial phase damages of x (the left-hand-side
of (1)). Regardless of the ruling on the PI, if the plainti proceeds to trial he incurs an additional
expenditure of cp, with the possible ultimate ruling in favor of the plainti averting damages of
(1   )x with probability . Otherwise, if settlement is agreed to, he receives an additional payo
of SOPI   (1   )x. The latter dominates the former for all plainti types with x  xPI. Hence,





V PI;T(x) := p   cPI   (1   )x   cp   (1   )(1   )x; x > xPI(^ xc);
V PI;S(xj^ xc) := p   cPI   (1   )x   cp   (1   )
 
x   xPI(^ xc)

; x  xPI(^ xc):
(9)
The plainti bases his ling decision on whichever payo, V PI or V N, is greater, given his type.
133.3 Signaling Equilibrium
Having derived the litigants' incentives, we now consider the equilibrium and demonstrate the
existence and uniqueness of a signaling equilibrium. This requires that there is a unique pair
(^ x; ^ xc) with ^ x = ^ xc. That is, in equilibrium, the defendant's conjecture about the plainti's actions
must be consistent with the actual decision to request a PI.
Proposition 1 (Equilibrium Existence and Uniqueness) There exists a proportion of dam-
ages accruing in the trial phase ~  := 
+ such that whenever  > ~ , there exists a unique sequential
equilibrium.
To understand the intuition for a minimum proportion of damages accruing in the trial phase
(~ ), suppose that only a small fraction of the total damages accrue during litigation. Then plainti
types with very high damage levels request a PI in the hopes of preventing current damages,
while those with intermediate damage levels proceed directly to trial without the motion for a PI.
However, plainti types with very low damages may le for a PI simply to receive a very high
settlement oer in response to a ling decision, resulting in a non-monotonic ling decision.
The intuition for the uniqueness of the equilibrium is that the higher is the defendant's belief
concerning the threshold type, the higher is the settlement oer that is made; which, in turn, lowers
the threshold for making worthwhile the expense of ling for a PI. That is, the plainti's incentive
to le for a PI moves in the opposite direction of the defendant's belief about the threshold, assuring
a unique crossing, and thus a unique equilibrium.
The plainti's equilibrium payo as a function of his type is depicted in Figure 2.
For the case depicted (i.e., with xN < ^ x) the plainti's strategy is given by
Filing and Settlement Decisions:
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That is, upon ling for a PI the defendant proposes settlement terms that any plainti type with
x  xPI accepts; those with higher damages proceed to trial. When not ling for a PI the defendant
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Figure 2: Plainti's Payo: V (x) = max

V N;S(xj^ x);V N;T(x);V PI;S(xj^ x);V PI;T(x)
	
Theorem 1 (Signaling Prior to Trial) In the unique equilibrium some plainti types incur the
cost of ling for a PI solely to signal that they do not have low damages in anticipation of thereby
obtaining the high settlement oer before settling out-of-court.
The intuition behind the signaling aspect of the equilibrium is that ling for a PI separates
the plainti types into two groups (cf. Figure 2). The group that incurred the cost of ling for a
PI are oered better settlement terms. Thus, recalling the benchmark threshold type for ling for
a PI, ^ xB, given in (2), a plainti of type x 2 [^ x; ^ xB) les for a PI solely in order to dierentiate
himself from lower-damage plainti types in anticipation of obtaining a more favorable settlement
oer, which is then accepted forsaking the possibility of a subsequent trial. While it is also the
case that plainti types with x 2

^ xB;xPI
le for a PI and then subsequently settle, these are
not engaged in signaling, as they would have incurred the cost of ling for a PI even absent any
potential settlement. In sum, whenever x 2 [^ x; ^ xB) the plainti incurs the cost associated with
requesting a PI, not to ward o current harm due to the action of the defendant, but rather as a
means of obtaining favorable settlement terms from the defendant in the settlement stage, as the
costly ling decision is a credible way to signal that the plainti's damages are not low.
A concern encountered in all signaling models is potential welfare losses implied by costly
signaling. Due to the important defensive role of PIs in the non-signaling ranges of damages,
eliminating the option of PIs to prevent potentially costly signaling is not an appropriate benchmark
15consideration for welfare implications of the strategic (i.e., signaling) use of ling for PIs. Instead,
to ascertain welfare implications of signaling it is worth considering how the case plays out when
litigants are myopic and are unaware of the potential strategic signaling use of ling for a PI.
Remarkably, such a comparison reveals that the overall welfare eects of the signaling use of ling
for a PI may be positive.
Theorem 2 (Signaling and Increased Likelihood of Settlement) The probability of
out-of-court settlement increases due to signaling compared to the non-strategic benchmark, when-
ever













B := xPI(^ xc = ^ xB) is the threshold for settling when oers are made that are consistent
with the benchmark (myopic) ling decision ^ xB, given in (2).
The intuition behind the theorem is that the threshold for ling is lower in the signaling equi-
librium than in the non-signaling benchmark. On the one hand, this lowers the settlement oer to
plainti types who le for the PI so that out-of-court settlement becomes less likely among those
who le for purely defensive (i.e., non-strategic) reasons. This is welfare decreasing in that for
these cases litigants incur trial costs and the court system incurs the costs of administering the
trial. On the other hand, however, all plainti types that are engaged in signaling will now settle.
If the benchmark settlement oer made to plaintis who did not le for a PI was insuciently









settle only in the signaling equilibrium, whereas in the benchmark they
proceed to trial. Whenever the mass of intermediate-damage plainti types who end up settling
solely due to signaling (i.e., the numerator of (10)) outweighs the mass of high-damage plainti
types who no longer are made an acceptable settlement oer (i.e., the denominator of (10)), the
overall welfare eects of signaling are positive, provided that the costs of initially ling for the PI do
not exceed the savings from discontinued litigation upon settlement. The reason behind this is that
signaling increases the likelihood of out-of-court settlement and, thus, reduces the costs associated
with proceeding to trial. The incidence of increased settlement due to signaling is illustrated in the
following example.
Example Consider a uniform distribution of damages, i.e., F(x) =
x x
















so the welfare losses associated














x x . Moreover, a sucient condition for there to be an increase in the
number of cases settled out-of-court is that ^ x > xN,22 since then the gains for intermediate range
plainti types who now settle are proportional to F (^ xB)   F (^ x) = ^ xB ^ x
x x , yielding a net increase
that is proportional to
1=2(^ xB ^ x)
x x > 0.
Note that we consider welfare in a narrow sense conned to the particulars of the litigation
modeled. Thus, we abstract from potential welfare gains that may accrue in some legal settings
due to increased overall legal clarity should a court make a nal ruling (see, e.g., Farrell and Merges
(2004) or Lemley and Shapiro (2005) concerning the potential value of obtaining nal rulings in
patent cases). However, if the public good value of legal clarity is positively correlated with damages,
then signaling has the added benecial eect of shifting settlement towards lower-damage cases,
with a greater number of high-damage cases obtaining a nal adjudication in the court.
4 The Extended Model: Learning
Thus far it has been assumed that a hearing on a PI request and the subsequent court ruling|either
approval or denial of the requested injunctive relief|has no informational implications. Strictly
speaking, this means that from an informational standpoint the PI ruling is pure noise. In fact,
however, both plainti and defendant reveal information in the hearing and the resulting court
ruling is generally regarded as being indicative of the nal ruling that the court makes if the case
proceeds to trial. The court's ruling, for instance, may reect the court's best assessment of the
merits of the case, which is correlated with the true state of the world concerning the case; and
it may also be the case that a judge becomes reluctant to subsequently change her views of the
merits, as the cite by Brooks and Schwartz in the introduction might suggest. In any event, as
the underlying facts of the case and their legal implications are yet to be further developed in the
course of ongoing discovery, the ruling on preliminary injunctive relief cannot be a prefect predictor
of the nal nding.
To formalize this, we denote by  the frequency with which a PI is denied, even though a
subsequent ruling by the court would nd for the plainti (i.e., when the case is valid). And 
gives the frequency with which a defendant is initially enjoined, even though the court would rule
22The necessary and sucient condition is that 1=2(^ xB + ^ x) > x
N.
17in favor of the defendant upon further consideration at trial (i.e., the case is invalid).23 Table 1,
then, shows the likelihood matrix for the ruling on PIs, given the true state of the world.
Ruling:
Grant Deny
() (1   )
Valid () 1     Underlying State:
Invalid (1   )  1   
Table 1: Likelihood Matrix for Rulings on the Preliminary Injunction
Given the relationship between PI rulings and the underlying case strength, the probability
that a PI is granted when it is led is
 := (1   ) + (1   ): (11)
After a suit is brought, the parties revise their beliefs about the case strength on the basis of
whether a PI is led and, whenever this is done, what the court's ruling on the request is. Posterior
beliefs are denoted by H, where H 2 fN;G;Dg is the case history, with N denoting that no
request for a PI is led, and G and D denoting the court's decision to either grant (G) or deny
(D) a request. By Bayes' rule, the updated belief about the likelihood of the plainti ultimately
prevailing at trial is given by
H =
8
> > > > > <
> > > > > :
(1 )
(1 )+(1 ) = 1 
 ; for H = G;

+(1 )(1 ) = 
1 ; for H = D;
 for H = N:
(12)
Finally, while we acknowledge that there may be a systematic court bias in one direction or the
other, we assume that a ruling in favor of the PI is always good news for the plainti, whereas a
ruling against the PI is always good news for the defendant. That is, D <  < G, which requires
that  +  < 1.
23If one takes the view that|in hindsight|a PI ruling is erroneous when it diers from a nal ruling a trial, then
a PI grant in an invalid case is referred to as Type-I error, false positive or  error, while denial followed by a nding
for the plainti is called a Type-II error, false negative, or  error. Our notation is evocative of third convention.
184.1 Screening and Settlement after Learning
Since the ling decision precedes the court's ruling, the defendant's posterior beliefs about the
damage level of the plainti are captured by the same updating procedure as before (see (4)), given
that there exists a threshold level of damages above which a PI is sought.24 If no PI is sought, no
learning takes place concerning the case strength and the analysis of the previous section continues
to hold. Thus, given beliefs about the threshold for ling, the settlement oer derived previously
for the case when no PI is sought remains the same (cf. Lemma 1).
However, upon ling for a PI, the subsequent hearing and the court's ruling on the request allows
litigants to reassess the case strength, which impacts the plainti's willingness to settle. Hence,
the defendant's settlement oer is inuenced by the hearing and the ruling on the PI. Specically,





SOG(^ xc) := G(1   )xG(^ xc)   cp;
SOD(^ xc) := D(1   )xD(^ xc)   cp;
(13)
with xG and xD being implied by (4) in conjunction with (6) when posterior beliefs (12) replace
prior beliefs (Lemma 1).
The impact of these settlement oers on the likelihood of the case proceeding to trial is illus-
trated in Figure 3 and formalized in the following theorem.
Theorem 3 (Out-of-Court Settlement after Learning) Out-of-court settlement is more likely
after a PI is denied and less likely after a PI is granted, compared to the benchmark without learning.
To understand Theorem 3, note that a plainti who is granted the PI is more optimistic about
winning the case than a plainti who is denied the motion (i.e., D < G). In response, the
defendant makes a higher out-of-court settlement oer upon a grant of the PI. However, since this
increased settlement oer must be paid not only to the threshold type, but also to all infra-marginal
types, the defendant's equilibrium oer in response to a grant falls short of what would be needed
to oset the increased condence of the threshold type and the overall measure of plainti types
that are willing to settle is diminished, i.e., xG  xD. Conversely, when a PI is denied it becomes
cheaper to buy o the plainti and some of the implied savings are used to increase the threshold
24Again, we conjecture at this point that a monotone equilibrium ling decision exists|a conjecture that is veried
subsequently.
19type who is made an acceptable out-of-court settlement oer. In sum, out-of-court settlement
becomes more likely after a PI is denied, whereas settlement is less likely after a PI is granted. In
particular then, plainti types with damages x 2

xG;xD
settle only upon having their PI request













Figure 3: Out-Of-Court Settlement after Learning
Theorem 3 suggests that having a high threshold for granting a PI may be advantageous in
terms of its facilitation of out-of-court settlement. However, to substantiate this, one needs to solve
for the equilibrium cum ling decision, since the equilibrium ling decision is made in anticipation
of the implications that learning has on subsequent settlement and trial decisions.
4.2 Equilibrium in Anticipation of Learning
We now consider how learning about the case strength on the basis of the court's ruling on the
PI aects the signaling equilibrium. The equilibrium is derived as was done previously when there
were no informational implications of the court ruling.
Consider rst the plainti's payos. If no PI is sought, no learning takes place concerning the
case strength and the analysis of the previous section continues to hold. Thus, payos are the same
as before and (8) captures the plainti's payos for the case that no PI is requested. However, the





V G;T(x) := p   cPI   (1   )x   cp   (1   )
 
1   G
x; x > xG(^ xc);
V G;S(xj^ xc) := p   cPI   (1   )x   cp   (1   )
 
x   GxG(^ xc)

;x < xG(^ xc);
(14)





V D;T(x) := p   cPI   (1   )x   cp   (1   )
 
1   D
x; x > xD(^ xc);
V D;S(xj^ xc) := p   cPI   (1   )x   cp   (1   )
 
x   DxD(^ xc)

;x < xD(^ xc);
(15)
20when the PI is denied.
Proposition 2 (Existence and Uniqueness with Learning) When  > ~  there exists a unique
signaling equilibrium, where ~  is as in Proposition 1.
To dierentiate this case from the model without learning, we denote the critical threshold
plainti type who is indierent between ling and not by ^ x0. The plainti's equilibrium payo as
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Figure 4: Plainti's Payos with Learning depend on the court's ruling for x  ^ x0
The plainti's strategy is given by
Filing and Settlement Decisions:
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That is, absent a motion for a PI, the defendant proposes settlement terms which plainti types
with x  xN accept. Upon ling for a PI, litigants base their subsequent actions on the court's
21ruling. If the request is denied, a modest settlement oer is made which nonetheless all but possibly
the very highest type accept, as the likelihood of them prevailing at trial is suciently diminished.
In contrast, upon a grant of the PI, a higher settlement oer is made, which nevertheless is rejected
by a greater number of plainti types (possibly even all);25 as these now stand a good chance of
obtaining a nal ruling in their favor.
While the plainti's payos are aected by the court's ruling because settlement oers and
subsequent out-of-court settlement are aected by the court's ruling, this need not impact the
incentive to le for a PI in the rst place. Indeed, for instance, for a uniform distribution of
damages, the decision to le is not aected by the anticipated frequencies  and , because the
expectation of the settlement oer is independent of these. This yields the following theorem.
Theorem 4 (Signaling Independent of Learning) Despite the fact that learning aects the
subsequent settlement decisions, the threshold ling decision can be unaected by the anticipation
of information and learning from the PI hearing and subsequent ruling.
While the incentive to le is unaected by the anticipation of learning, this does not imply
that the increased likelihood of settling out-of-court upon the denial is oset by the decreased
probability of an out-of-court settlement following a granting in terms of the overall probability
that the litigants settle out-of-court. In fact, the ex ante probability that the case ends in an
out-of-court settlement after a PI is led and ruled upon is unambiguously higher compared to the
case where a ruling does not reveal information about the case strength.
Theorem 5 (Increased Out-of-Court Settlement due to Learning) The overall likelihood of
out-of-court settlement when litigants learn about the case strength due to a hearing and ruling on
a PI request is strictly greater when compared to the case in which the PI hearing and ruling carry
no informational implications when damages are distributed uniformly.26 That is, the decreased ex-
pected number of cases settled out-of-court upon a grant is more than oset by the increased expected
number of cases that settle following a denial.
This may be viewed as somewhat surprising, since what is good news for one party is necessarily
bad news for the other party so it may not be clear ex ante that the overall probability of an
out-of-court settlement should be aected by learning. However, the intuition for the result of
25We remark upon such `corner' settlements in Subsection 5.1.
26Indeed, the result also holds for other distributions, e.g., the power distribution, but in the proof we restrict
ourselves to the closed form representations obtained for the uniform distribution.
22an increase in the likelihood of out-of-court settlement is directly tied to the insights established
by Theorem 3. There it is shown that the defendant is willing to trade o the amount of the
settlement oer with the likelihood that settlement takes place. The former aects all plainti
types who settle (marginal and infra-marginal types); the latter is determined only by the marginal
type. Because the number of infra-marginal types is smaller when a PI denied, the defendant's
adjustment towards achieving more out-of-court settlement is more pronounced following a denial
of the PI when compared to a grant. Thus, while a ruling in favor of the plainti decreases the
likelihood of out-of-court settlement, the increased likelihood of out-of-court settlement after a PI
denial leads to a greater likelihood of settlement overall|which substantiates Lichtman's assertion,
cited in the introduction, that hearings promote settlement.
5 Extensions
5.1 Corner solutions and dropping the case
An immediate implication of learning about the case strength and the resulting shift in settlement
oers is that even if interior solutions are assumed for the base model, this assumption need no
longer hold. In particular, there are two cases worth discussing. First, when a PI is denied, even
the plainti type with the highest possible damages x may become suciently pessimistic about
prevailing at trial that he accepts the proposed equilibrium settlement oer, i.e., x  xD so the
defendant simply buys the plainti o. Second, when a PI is granted, the plainti's chances at
prevailing at trial become so high that no settlement can be reached, i.e., xG  ^ x so the defendant
and plainti automatically proceed to trial without considering settlement.





learning leads to fewer plainti types ling for a PI (i.e., ^ x0 > ^ x). Conversely, if the grant of a PI




= ^ x), then learning leads to more plainti types
ling.
Somewhat distinct from these scenarios is another possibility, namely, that when a PI is granted
the defendant's chances of prevailing at trial become so small that she is better o ceasing the
disputed behavior and thereby ending the case, i.e., b 
cd
1 G. While on the surface this may seem
to make a ling for a PI more attractive the eect is actually not so clear, since the plainti in this
case also forsakes a potential settlement oer.
235.2 Legal remedies and injunction bonds
In the main analysis we restrict attention to equitable relief. However, in many cases the party that
ultimately prevails at trial may also be entitled to damage awards. Incorporating this in the analysis
can aect the parties' incentives to settle or proceed to trial (it may, thus, also aect possible
corner solutions), but this would leave the qualitative analysis unaected. Nevertheless, there
are two aspects in which legal remedies specically aect informational implications of requesting
preliminary relief.
First, in some cases a plainti who ultimately prevails at trial can also collect damage awards
from the defendant in compensation for harm that accrued during the trial phase (treble damages,
in fact, in civil antitrust cases). This diminishes the non-strategic incentive for requesting a PI,
because anticipated trial-phase damages are eectively reduced to x f x, where f x denotes (the
plainti's beliefs about) the court's assessment of the damages that are to be reimbursed. The
corollary to this reduction in the non-strategic use of PIs is of course that the signaling role of ling
for a PI is increased.
Second, sometimes a wrongfully enjoined defendant has a right to compensation from the plain-
ti. In particular, when having a preliminary injunction granted, the plainti may be asked to
post a bond. If the plainti prevails at trial (or a settlement agreement is reached) the amount of
the bond is returned to the plainti. However, if nal judgment goes against the plainti and it
is thus determined that the defendant was wrongfully enjoined, the bond is forfeited and paid out
to the defendant to compensate her for the loss of benets during the trial phase. In our analysis
we assumed that no benets accrue to the defendant during the trial phase, so this point would be
moot. If, in departure from this assumption, we require a bond of B to be posted upon the grant




implication is that the signaling role of ling for a PI becomes more pronounced. However, this is
somewhat oset by the newly created incentive of the oensive use of the PI, since now under a
grant the defendant is deprived of immediate benets, which induces a higher settlement oer.
5.3 The British rule in the allocation of litigation costs
Under the American fee rule, each party bears its own litigation costs regardless of the outcome at
trial, which has been assumed throughout the paper. Under the alternative British rule, in contrast,
the losing party bears all the litigation costs. A change in the governing rule in the allocation of
24litigation costs aects the litigants' payos and thus their decisions concerning settlement oers
and the motion for a PI. Specically, assuming that trial costs are reimbursed, but costs associated
with the PI are not, the plainti who goes directly to trial without ling for a PI need not pay his
litigation cost cp if he wins the case, whereas he must additionally bear the defendant's litigation
cost cd given a loss at trial. That is, the rule change from the American to the British rule has
the net impact of Hcp  
 
1   H
cd on the plainti's expected payo of going to trial, where
H 2 fG;Dg. Hence, the likelihood of a ling for a PI and of an out-of-court settlement hinge
upon the relative magnitude of litigation costs, the prior, and the posterior beliefs. For simplicity,





payo of going to trial. For the case of c
 
1   2D
> 0 > c
 
1   2G
; the cost-governing rule
change from American to British rules can make out-of-court settlement even more likely when a
PI is denied, but less likely when it is granted; compared to the previous analysis.
This analysis continues to hold even if some of the costs associated with the PI are also ruled to
be reimbursable; although if such a ruling also applies to costs incurred by the defendant (which for
simplicity we have assumed to be zero), then the initial ling for a PI and a continuation through
trial become less likely as the plainti's expected payos are diminished accordingly.
6 Conclusion
Corporate litigation is recognized to be an important tool used in competition. In many such
instances, such as in civil anti-trust, patent, copyright, trademark, employment and labor relations,
and contract cases, preliminary injunctions are an integral part of a litigant's legal strategy. The
primary legal rationale for the preliminary injunction is its defensive use to give a plainti the
opportunity to avert damage that the disputed behavior is causing while the litigants prepare for
and pursue a court trial. This motivation is reected in our model in that plaintis with high
damages are inclined to le a request for a PI, whereas those with low damages do not. While there
has been some discussion of the oensive use of PIs elsewhere, we show that even when considering
the defensive use of PIs plaintis have an incentive to use the ling of a PI strategically. In
particular, our paper is the rst to formally model the dissemination of information in the process
of the strategic use of preliminary injunctions motions.
We nd that when there is private information about the plainti's damages, the motion for
a PI signals bounds of the damage levels to the defendant. As a result of this, PIs are more
25readily requested when compared to the initial motivation that solely relies on the prevention of
current damages. While this strategic use, thus, goes beyond the purely defensive role of PIs, this
may nonetheless be overall welfare increasing as it can increase the likelihood of an out-of-court
settlement. In particular, fewer high-damage cases will be settled out-of-court, but this can be
more than oset by a greater number of lower damage cases that settle and no longer burden the
courts. However, to conclude that courts should therefore increase their propensity to grant PIs in
order to thereby increase the use of PIs is erroneous, because in doing so the signaling value of the
ling decision is actually diminished.
In addition to considering signaling motivations as an underlying incentive to le for a PI,
we consider the informational eects that arise due to the hearing on the motion and the court's
subsequent ruling on the request. In the wake of the hearing on the motion and the court's ruling,
litigants are able to glean information about the case strength and, thus, reassess their chances
of ultimately prevailing at trial. In particular, when the court declines to enjoin the defendant
and denies the request for a PI, litigants' beliefs that the plainti will ultimately prevail at trial
are diminished. As a consequence, lower settlement oers are made by the defendant, yet these
are accepted with greater frequency, precisely because the alternative of continued litigation is less
attractive to the plainti. Similarly, out-of-court settlements become less likely after a PI is granted
by the court as plaintis become suciently condent of being able to prevail at trial.
While the anticipation of learning about the merits of the case need not aect the primary
motivation for ling for a PI, we nd that the hearing and the court's ruling nonetheless unambigu-
ously increase the ex ante likelihood that litigants will come to an out-of-court settlement, which
does suggest that PIs in particular as well as other pre-trial motions in general should possibly
be facilitated. However, a simple increase in the likelihood that a PI is granted (i.e., lowering
the threshold for granting a PI) may not be eective, since out-of-court settlement becomes less
likely after the PI is granted. But, lowering the costs of PI by not forcing the plainti to lock in a
strategy, say, by bifurcating the trial and having a dierent judge hear the case after the PI, may
help, although this may also result in a diminished role of learning, since now the judge making
the nal ruling may dier in her assessment from the judge who makes the PI ruling.
The theoretical analysis yields some testable empirical implications. Thus, if it is possible to
distinguish between cases with greater and less uncertainty about damages, then the former will
more frequently have requests for preliminary relief, since PI lings are also used to overcome uncer-
tainty about damages by signaling bounds on damages. Moreover, if damages can be ascertained
26(or reasonable well estimated) ex post, i.e., after settlement takes place, then the signaling role
of PIs should result in a negative correlation between the incidence of a PI being requested and
the terms of settlement, since signaling shifts settlement to lower-damage cases. Lastly, because
signaling is tied to the cost of ling for a PI and signaling can increase the likelihood of out-of-court
settlement, there should be a positive correlation between the costs incurred in requesting a PI and
the subsequent likelihood of settlement.
While empirical predictions tied to signaling may suer from data limitations in terms of being
able to distinguish between dierent types of cases, the empirical prediction implied by learning is
straight forward. Namely, conditioned on a ruling on a given PI request, the incidence of settlement
should be more prevalent upon a denial compared to a granting of the PI, because in the former case
the defendant exploits the diminished legal position of the plainti to achieve more out-of-court
settlements.
Appendix of Proofs
Proof of Lemma 1 Note rst that since F has the MHRC, so do posterior beliefs FH, which
ensures the uniqueness of xS for a given history. Moreover, given the assumption that a defendant
is willing to make an oer to a plainti type who les, but is unwilling to buy him o, an interior
solution follows for the history in which a PI was sought. This establishes SOPI(^ xc).
If a PI is not sought, then surely terms of settlement are proposed. If the condition on the top
branch in (7) is met, then no interior solution to the defendant's problem exists, given her beliefs
about the threshold for ling. In this case the defendant oers full compensation for the perceived
damages. Otherwise the interior solution is implied by the bottom branch. 
Proof of Proposition 1 (8) and (9) jointly determine the set of all possible critical thresholds
^ x that leave the plainti indierent between requesting a PI and not, given any beliefs that the
defendant may have. Since a defendant will never oer more than is absolutely necessary to
induce the plainti to accept a settlement oer, for any set of beliefs min

xN(^ xc); ^ xc	
= xN(^ xc).
That is, the threshold plainti|when refraining from ling|will at best only just be bought o.
Therefore, V N;T(^ xc)  V N;S(^ xcj^ xc);8^ xc. Moreover, having postulated that the defendant's benets
are suciently high to warrant making an oer to the plainti who les for a PI, V PI;S(^ xcj^ xc) 
V PI;T(^ xc). And therefore, in equilibrium, the threshold plainti type must be indierent between
going straight to trial without ling for a PI and ling for a PI followed by an out-of-court settlement.
27In sum, at the threshold, V N;S(^ x)  V N;T(^ x) = V PI;S(^ x).
Since, for any beliefs ^ xc, V N;T and V PI;S are linear in x, they intersect only once and whenever
 > 
+ =: ~  the latter is atter so the monotonicity of the ling decision holds (i.e., Conjecture 1
is veried). Hence, for any belief ^ xc there exists a function that determines the threshold type ^ x,
call this function ^ x = (^ xc) : [x;x] ! [x;x], which is implied by V N;T() = V PI;S(j^ xc), i.e.,
^ x  (^ xc) =
cPI   (1   )xPI(^ xc)
   (1   )
; (16)
where from (6) in conjunctions with (4) xPI(^ xc) is implied by
Z(xPI; ^ xc) :=






  F (^ xc)
f (xPI)
  xPI = 0:
Since the density of prior beliefs is continuous, xPI(^ xc) is continuous, and therefore so is (^ xc).
Hence, by Brouwer's xed point theorem there exists an equilibrium. Moreover, dxPI
d^ xc =  
Z^ xc
ZxPI is
positive, since the denominator is negative by the suciency of the defendant's rst-order-condition,
due to the MHRC, and the numerator is positive, since
f(^ xc)
f(xPI) > 0. Hence () is downward sloping
and thus the xed point giving the equilibrium is unique. 







(xPI   ^ x) <
cPI

= ^ xB; (17)
implying that plaintis of type x 2 [^ x; ^ xB) use the ling for a PI as a means to signal to the
defendant that they do not have low damages. 
Proof of Theorem 3 The MHRC on the distribution of damage levels implies that xG  xD,




settle only upon having their PI request denied compared to when a PI is granted. 
Proof of Proposition 2 The method of proof is as before. In determining the threshold plainti
type who is indierent between requesting a PI and proceeding straight to trial, the relevant payo
used to determine the ling decision is given by the expectation across (14) and (15), as the ling
decision necessarily precedes the court's ruling on the PI. Consequently, noting that G = (1 )








(1   )xG (^ xc) + xD (^ xc)

: (18)




, the remainder of the proof follows the proof of Proposition
1 mutatis mutandis. 
Proof of Theorem 4 We prove the theorem using the case of uniformly distributed damages, but







(xPI   ^ x):
In contrast, when there is learning, ^ x0 is implied by (8) and (18). Specically, V N;T(^ x0) =
E











(1   )xG + xD   ^ x0
: (19)
From (6) the cut-o for out-of-court settlement given a uniform distribution of damages is of the











^ x; ^ x0	
: (20)
Thus, using (12),




^ x0 + (1   )
Gb + cd + cp
G(1   )
+ 







^ x0 + 
b + cd + cp
(1   )
+ (1   )




and by substituting back into (19) and comparing to (17), it follows that ^ x = ^ x0. 
Proof of Theorem 5 For the uniform distribution the ex ante likelihood of out-of-court settlement
after ling is directly proportional to xH. For the case with learning the expected probability of
an out-of-court settlement after ling is therefore proportional to xG + (1   )xD; whereas it is
similarly proportional to xPI for the case without learning. Now notice that starting from (20) and
using the fact that ^ x = ^ x0, from Theorem 4












() 2 + (1   )2(1   ) > (1   )
() (1   ( + ))2 > 0,
and the result follows. 
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